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Introduction
Over more than a decade, we have developed a model of how people think of themselves in terms of national identity, how they employ what we have called identity markers, and the processes involved in claiming national identity, as well as the reception of these claims by others. Our early work was based on 'qualitative' research, in particular intensive interviews with significant others (landed and arts elites), and with people living in 'debatable lands' along the Scottish-English border. In a previous paper in this journal (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2008) , we argued that one's national identity is greatly affected by how one's claims are regarded by others. If you claim a particular national identity, and your claim is rejected, it has the potential to lead to social exclusion.
In that paper, our findings were based on a set of exploratory survey questions asked in the Scottish and British Social Attitudes surveys for 2003.
In We start from the common assumption that Scots and English people have different ways of 'doing' national identity (Kumar, 2003 : Weight, 2002 .
Whereas the Scots forefront being Scottish over being British, the English are believed to be less concerned with, or even confused about 'national' (i.e.
English) identity. The implication might be that Scots are likely to take a more restrictive view of claims to be Scottish than the English do of claims to be English. A related question is, if national identity is important in judging claims, is it more important in Scotland than in England? Also, in both nations, do other factors such as a respondent's social class, education, age or gender attenuate or even supersede the effects of national identity?
The second set of issues we will examine is concerned with how 'race' affects claims to be 'national' in the two countries. We might expect that Scots will be less likely to accept claims from non-white persons to be Scottish, given both the importance Scots attach to national identity, and the fact that there are fewer nonwhites living there (2% compared with 9% in England). In other words, 'Scottish' is possibly more likely to equate with 'being white'. On the other hand, our previous work did discover that 'being English' was more of barrier to being taken for Scottish than being non-white (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2008: 1261) .
Identity Markers And Rules
In our approach to national identity, we define markers as 'those social characteristics presented to others to support a national identity claim and looked to in others, either to attribute national identity, or receive and assess any claims or attributions made' (Kiely et al., 2001: 35-6 What happens when, explicitly or implicitly, people make a claim about their identity to one or more others in a particular situation? These others may accept or reject that claim, and they too may do so implicitly or explicitly. In interviews, people have sometimes told us that they would never explicitly reject a claim, because people are entitled to call themselves English or Scottish if they so wish and it is unnecessary or churlish to challenge them. Other people are more forthright in their views. But, as in all forms of interaction, people anticipate responses and may modify their claims, or not make them at all if they fear rejection. That is why identity markers are important. We know from extensive qualitative research in a diversity of situations that the crucial ones are birth, accent, parentage (sometimes extending backwards in time as ancestry), and residence; at least, these are the ones people cite most often. More recently we have examined the impact of 'race' in the form of white and non-white, because 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Alibhai-Brown, 2000; ONS, 2008) .
As we set out previously (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2008) , there are 'identity rules' which are probabilistic rules of thumb which guide, rather than enforce, judgements about who is, or is not, one of us (Kiely et al., 2001) . Markers and rules are usually implicit and taken-for-granted, only coming to the fore more explicitly when something is problematic and contested about them.
Our initial focus was on how individuals construct their own national identities, and in particular the markers they use, and our intensive interviews indicated that national identity was often matter-of-fact, and in Billig's terms (1995) , banal, and taken-for-granted. Most of the time people have no reason to ask themselves questions about their own national identity; they are what they are, usually on the basis of where they were born. However, in the course of lengthy face to face interviews they were able and willing to explore their sense of national identity in considerable detail, discussing, as we outlined above, markers such as place of birth, parentage, upbringing, and place of residence. We explored how they might attribute national identity to 'others', and the processes whereby they made judgments about other people's claims. Broadly the processes of selfidentification and claims to identity, are similar to those of attribution and acceptance or rejection of claims.
At this stage, we should caution the reader against too readily classifying these markers as 'ethnic' or 'civic' iv 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 in practice they may not be seen as representations of either civic or ethnic identity but subtler combinations of the two'. As Jonathan Hearn has argued, the distinction between ethnic and civic has more to do with opposing styles of argument than with measurable concepts (Hearn, 2000: 94) .
Surveying National Identity Claims
Following on from our qualitative studies, we have been developing and refining an approach to studying identity using survey methodology, not because we doubt the findings from our qualitative studies or think a quantitative approach superior;
research methods should not be seen as competing but as illuminating questions in different ways. Qualitative methods vary: interviews fall on a continuum from unstructured to structured, they may be non-directive or more focused in varying ways, based on individuals or groups and we have rung the changes in our work. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 and used quite similar approaches and sets of questions.
Because there clearly is some force in the arguments against surveys and especially against the use of pre-determined questions to investigate national identity, it is important to make two points here vi . These question were not pre- 
Accepting And Rejecting Claims In England And Scotland
The basic approach asks respondents born in England or Scotland to accept or reject a sequence of ever stronger and more plausible claims made by a person born in the other country.
Acceptance and rejection of claims in England
Respondents Scottish on grounds of permanent residence, followed by residence and accent, followed by residence, accent and parentage.
We followed this battery with three further questions, identical except that the person was now stated to be non-white. Table 2 gives the results. We shall focus on the proportions above and below the mid-point and would urge caution in making too much of the difference between 'definitely would' and 'probably would'. The effect of successively lowering the barrier to acceptance is clear for whites and non-whites alike. If the only claim to English identity is permanent residence, less than half (45%) would probably or definitely accept the claim of a white person. Introduce the 'appropriate' accent and that rises to 60 per cent. The ability to claim English parents results in an even larger increase with four out of five people accepting the claim (81%). The one in six people (17%) rejecting even the strongest claim almost certainly reflects the importance of the birth criterion.
The figures for the hypothetical non-white person are similar, with any sizeable difference only occurring when parentage is introduced. At this point the claims of whites are nine per cent more likely to be accepted than non-whites.
There may, then, be some 'racism' involved. Assessing the meaning of these data is however not straightforward. First, it may be that some people were less than truthful because they sensed the question might be tapping racism. A further complication is that the line between 'prejudice' and 'discrimination' is a fine one and we cannot tell whether those who say they would not accept a non-white claim would act differently towards the person as a result xi . For instance, we know that there is reluctance for non-white persons to describe themselves as English even to those willing to accept them as British and defend their civic rights. The
Office of National Statistics observes: 'People from the White British group were more likely to describe their national identity as English (58 per cent) rather than British (36 per cent). However, the opposite was true of the non-white groups, 
Acceptance and rejection of claims in Scotland
So, do things look different in Scotland? The results are given in Table 3 . introduced and rising to 13 per cent when parentage is brought into the picture.
We might have expected greater differences between England and Scotland because Scottish nationals are more inclined to choose Scottish national identity than their counterparts in England are to choose English national identity (see Table 1 ). The non-white proportion of the population is also much smaller in Scotland, though this could cut both ways. Greater familiarity with non-white persons could lead to greater tolerance and willingness to accept them as English in England; or on the other hand the much lower numbers in Scotland might make the issue of 'race' far less salient. If we look at the rejection rates in the two countries, the conclusion must be that the differences are minimal. As regards the claims of white persons, in no case is the differential more than 3 points, and it declines further as the barriers to acceptance are lowered. The rejection rates in Scotland compared with England for non-white persons are larger (-8, -7, and -4 respectively) but once more they decline steadily as indicators of national identity are added. The two countries are similar in their willingness to accept or reject claims made by people born in the 'other' country regardless of whether they are white or non-white, albeit the data do suggest slightly greater prejudice in Scotland. We shall return to this briefly later in this paper.
Who Is Most Likely To Reject Claims?
We now examine whether some groups of people are more likely to reject the claims than others and, again, whether England and Scotland differ in this regard given their overall similarity. We have collapsed the 4-point scale (definitely accept, probably accept, probably reject, definitely reject) into 'accept' and 'reject', and the figures in the tables are the proportions rejecting the claim.
National identity
We turn first to examine the effect of respondents' national identity. per cent and 10 per cent. That almost 4 in 10 self-defining 'exclusive nationals' in both countries would reject the claim of a non-white person even with the appropriate accent and parentage, simply because they were born in the other country is cause for concern. So is the fact that among the slightly less national 'English/Scottish more than British' group as many as 29 per cent in England, and 25 per cent in Scotland would also reject this claim. One might ask what a nonwhite person could do to overcome the twin accidents of 'race' and birthplace when it comes to being accepted as English or a Scot, for the tendency to reject is virtually the same in the two countries.
Education
The other variable which makes an ostensible difference to whether or not respondents reject claims is education (see tables A1 and A2 in appendix). The gradients are not perfectly smooth but the overall picture is clear. The higher the level of education attained by the respondent, the less likely they are to reject the claim, whether by a white or a non-white, and almost regardless of its basis - Neither social class nor gender generates much variation as regards rejecting national identity claims. By social class, claims relating to white people show no clear gradient. In England, the pattern is much the same in the case of claims by non-whites but in Scotland the highest social class are rather less likely to reject claims at all three levels, and the bottom three classes more likely so to do. As regards gender, while there are small differences, the general pattern of rejection by men and women does not differ greatly. The tendency already discussed to reject non-white claims more than white claims is reproduced within each sex.
A Brief Summary
Taking these five variables of national identity, sex, age, social class and education one at a time, two things are fairly clear. Although there are differences, their impact is broadly similar in England and Scotland. There is no a priori reason why these five variables should produce strikingly different patterns in the two societies and the differences are less striking than the similarities. Secondly, although there is some variation by sex, age and social class, it is national identity and education that show the clearest patterns of differentiation.
Modelling The Data
These descriptive features are, of course, not independent of each other.
Educational attainment, for example, is not independent of age and social class.
While it is tempting to believe that a person's sense of national identity will have the major impact on whether they accept or reject claims by persons from the We have modelled the data using binary logistic regression. The dependent variable is divided as above and we have modelled it with respect to 'reject'. In the text however, for greater ease of comprehension, we have referred to lesser and greater degrees of acceptance. In England the reference category is 'English not British' and in Scotland, 'Scottish not British'. We shall, as a shorthand, refer to these two groups as 'exclusively English' and 'exclusively Scottish'.
Results From The Models xiii
The results of the modelling exercise can be easily summarized. British' groups are more likely to accept the claims; although the 'British more than Scottish' and 'British not Scottish' groups are even more likely so to do, the differences are not usually statistically significant. In England, while the 'English more than British' group is more accepting than the exclusively English, this difference is rarely significant, unlike the corresponding difference in Scotland. It is also the case that, unlike in Scotland, there is not always an increasing gradient of acceptance across the categories as one moves towards the British end, albeit the three most British groups are significantly more accepting than the exclusively English group. In England, then, the 'equally English and British' group form a kind of threshold, whereas in Scotland, the more British the identity the greater the contrast with the reference category of the exclusively Scottish. in Scotland this is not generally the case.
In England the effect remains very similar as one adds in another marker; in Scotland the effect weakens as one adds in markers for whites, presumably because it is seen as increasingly self-evident to respondents that the hypothetical person must have been born in England. However, the effect remains much the same for non-whites.
The effect of having a degree, which in terms of education is what matters most, strengthens as one adds in markers in both countries and is stronger for nonwhites than whites. This is in line with evidence that the experience of higher education, exposed to a wider range of ideas and beliefs, and encouraged to think critically and independently, encourages the development of liberal, tolerant views xv . Such mind-sets appear to make people more accepting of the idea that the claim of someone to be English or Scottish is strengthened if they possess appropriate markers, be they white or non-white.
Conclusion
In conceptual terms, it is clear that respondents interviewed in the survey recognise the kind of model which we have developed over many years in terms of how people may make claims to national identity. The results are consistent, clearly patterned and reinforce what we have established in the qualitative studies.
Our survey work enables us to put our previous findings in a statistical context, and to explore the data in ways which we could not do before. It is a significant finding that Scotland and England are very similar in the way in which respondents accept and reject hypothetical claims, be they by white or non-white persons. These similarities are striking in the light of the differences in the strength of national identity in the two countries, and arguably rather different ways of construing identity. Small differences do exist between the two countries, for instance in the slightly greater tendency for Scots to reject nonwhite claims, but they must be understood in this general context of similarity.
Looking at the extreme groups, in both countries, the exclusive nationals are more likely to reject claims from non-white than white people if they are not born in the appropriate country. Are they being racist? Possibly, but they are also, and only slightly less, likely to reject claims from white people who are not born there.
Place of birth seems to be the crucial criterion, a sine qua non, for the exclusive nationals. It must be a matter of some concern that in both countries the rejection rate is higher for non-whites. Admittedly this 'prejudice' may not translate into action on the ground, but it is disturbing that some people in both countries are more reluctant to accept non-whites than whites as 'one of us' if they were not born in that country. Those who think of themselves as exclusively English or Scottish seem especially likely to reject the claims of non-white people. When the data for BSA 2008 and SSA 2009 are both to hand we shall be able to explore this further because we shall have data relating to hypothetical persons who were both born and resident in England and Scotland.
Plainly, the politics of national identity plays differently in each country.
Being 'English' in England is not the stuff of party politics, whereas in Scotland it is. Those arguing for 'English' rights either in the form of separate arrangements for dealing with 'English only' legislation at Westminster, still less having an English parliament, remain on the fringes of the main political parties. The fear has been expressed that permitting the English to proclaim their national identity at the expense of being 'British' would mark the beginning of the end of the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Citizenship is not the same as national identity. The latter involves cultural markers, of birth, ancestry, language as well as residence, and operates through complex processes of social interaction. Gaining a proper sociological understanding of the way people identify these markers, and the rules they employ to decide who is or is not 'one of us', and for what purposes, is not as straightforward as politicians and others believe but remains both intriguing and important. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to the anonymous referees for theirs. David McCrone produced the first draft of the article, but it is the product of a collegiate form of working in which the data, the analysis and the drafts have been discussed by both authors throughout, and they are equally responsible for it. ii We use this phrase intentionally to emphasise the performative aspect.
iii This is a deliberate allusion to the work of early Chicago social interactionists and to Erving Goffman in particular, with their focus on the capacity of social actors to negotiate and mobilise identities when interacting with others in various social contexts. We find his work insightful in a general sense, without implying that we are following a specifically 'Goffmanesque' research strategy.
iv One of the journal's referees suggested that some of the findings below should be related to the theoretical literature on this topic. v 'Race' divides not simply into white and non-white, with different degrees of willingness to accept people within each of those broad racial groups, but our aim was to see whether 'race' made a difference at the broad aggregate level. vi We are grateful to one of the journal's referees for suggesting we should address these important issues in this paper. vii The surveys are carried out on residents in Britain and Scotland but data on respondents' place of birth makes the analysis possible.
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